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1 INTRODUCTION
The globalization of national economies and the pace of technological progress increase the over-
all level of competition locally and globally. This in turn raises questions regarding the economic
role of the State as a regulator of economic activities. Demands for profound reforms of the
regulated sector and government institutions are expressed in numerous countries. Indeed most
countries have designed and begun implementing reforms aimed at increasing the performance
of their regulated sector. The OECD public management service (PUMA) provides numer-
ous examples of national policies towards that goal. A signicant example among many is the
implementation in England of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) procedures at the
municipal and regional levels. The local authorities must call for tenders for an increasing array
of government services before deciding whether those services will be oered by a direct munic-
ipal service organization or a private company under dierent forms of delegated management
contracts with the local authorities.
1
The underlying leitmotifs are performance, incentives and
competition of one kind or another.
2
The preferred path of public sector reform has generally
been to privatize and liberalize former public sectors.
3
However, many activities will and must
remain under government's direct control for natural monopoly or national interest reasons.
How incentives, within public rms and institutions or within regulated private rms, should
respond to this more competitive environment ?
4
In this paper, we study a regulation problem with complete contracting and a benevolent
regulator (the principal) in a principal-agent model with adverse selection. We analyze the
comparative statics eects on the power of incentives in the regulated rm or administration
(the agent) of various parameter changes usually associated with greater competitive pressures.
This is a necessary step to explore how greater competitive pressures may aect incentives when
1
See LeGallo (1998).
2
There exists also an important literature which has investigated Machlup's (1967) claim that there is no
managerial slack when a rm operates in a perfectly competitive output market. Leibenstein (1966) has provided
empirical evidence from case studies supporting the common view that increasing competition reduces slack.
3
It is often accompanied by sizable downsizing. See Jeon and Laont (1999) for a study of the incentive
problems created by downsizing.
4
One possibility is sometimes to introduce competition within the regulated sector itself. However, this often
requires wasteful duplications so that competition will remain limited for example to duopolies or restricted
oligopolies. Auriol and Laont (1992) have investigated the changes on incentives brought about by this duopoly
structure. See also Dana and Speir (1994) and Anton and Yao (1989, 1992).
1
regulation is imperfect or captured. One major diÆculty in this context resides in the fact that
there is no single denition of what increased competition means.
The level of competitive pressures exerted on the public sector may be directly decided by
the government when activities which were monopolies are liberalized. We want to explore a
more indirect notion of increased competitive pressures. The level of competition itself is not an
exogenous parameter as emphasized by Bliss and Di Tella (1997) who criticize the modeling of
greater competition by the increase in the number of competitors which is an endogenous vari-
able at the industry level. They suggest that more fundamental parameters, such as transport
costs, cost uncertainty, distribution and overhead cost, should be used. We recognize the im-
portance of this point and we will follow their suggestion as much as possible. However, for our
purpose, a partial equilibrium analysis which considers changes in parameters of the environment
(which are indeed endogenous in a more general analysis) is suÆcient to understand some of
the links by which increased competition aects incentives in the regulated sector. We consider
such parameters, namely the information structure, the threat of bankruptcy, the opportunities
available to agents, the technologies and the quality of substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in Section 2 followed by
the presentation of the basic model in Section 3. We study the informational eect in Section
4. We devote Section 5 to the threat of liquidation eect while Section 6 examines competition
in talent. The impacts of a more eÆcient private sector and of improvements in substitutes for
the regulated product are investigated in Section 7. We then conclude in Section 8.
2 COMPETITION AND INCENTIVES.
To review the literature on competition and incentives, we can regroup the articles according to
several criteria. Two such criteria are the type of agency problem considered and the channel by
which competition aects incentives. According to the rst criterion, papers dier according to
the type of model which formalizes the agency problem within the rm, moral hazard or adverse
selection. According to the second criterion, papers dier by the channel through which greater
competition aects the level of managerial slack, that is, whether it is through an informational
2
eect, an incentive constraint eect, a principal's objective function eect, or an individual
rationality constraint eect. The informational eect refers to the fact that greater competition
may increase the information of the principal about the agent and therefore decrease the cost of
asymmetric information. The incentive constraint eect is that greater competition may aect
directly the agent's incentive constraint for example by making it easier or more diÆcult for a
good type to mimic a bad type agent. The principal's objective function eect is that greater
competition may aect directly the value of production for the principal and consequently the
value for him of creating incentives for the agent: the desirable change in production may then
aect or not the incentive constraint of the agent. The individual rationality constraint eect
conveys the idea that greater competition may increase or reduce the outside opportunities of
the agent and therefore her reservation utility level.
We can illustrate this classication in the following matrix. In each cell, we place the papers
dealing with a similar agency problem and a similar channel but dealing possibly with dierent
institutional contexts. As indicated in Table 1, our paper ts into four cells. In Holmstrom
(1982), relative performance evaluation, or competition among agents, is used in order to exploit
the valuable information conveyed by the other agents' outputs regarding the eort of a given
agent. In Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983) and Shleifer (1985), the principal can infer, from observing
the outputs of all agents, some information on the level of eort chosen by a given agent and
therefore competition enables the design of more eÆcient reward structures.
5
In Hart (1983)
and Scharfstein (1988), competition between entrepreneurial rms and managerial rms makes it
more diÆcult for managers to shirk. Hart (1983) shows that the market system by itself makes
the actions and utilities of dierent managers interdependent via prices.
6
Scharfstein (1988)
shows that the net eect of competition on managerial slack depends on managerial preferences
and the number of states and therefore, incentive problems are not always mitigated by greater
competition. Increasing the number of bidders in an auction of contracts with adverse selection
5
The yardstick competition argument was further extended to agents with dierent but correlated character-
istics by Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988) for a principal who is a discriminating monopolist or an auctioneer,
and by Riordan and Sappington (1988) when regulating a rm with an ex post signal correlated with the rm's
characteristics.
6
Competition makes the performance of dierent rms interdependent but the impact on incentives works in
a dierent way from Holmstrom (1982). While the latter assumed that the performances of similar rms could
be observed by the principal and therefore used in compensation schemes, they are not in Hart's analysis.
3
as in Laont and Tirole (1987) also aects the incentive constraints of the agents.
TABLE 1
Moral
Hazard
Adverse
Selection
Information
structure
Holmstrom (1982)
Hermalin (1992)
Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983)
Shleifer (1985)
this paper (prop:1;2)
Incentive
constraint
Hermalin (1992)
Schmidt (1997)
Hart (1983)
Scharfstein (1988)
Laont and Tirole (1987)
this paper (prop:3)
Principal
0
s
objective
function
Hermalin (1994)
Schmidt (1997)
this paper (prop:5;6)
Participation
constraint
this paper (prop:4)
In Hermalin (1992), the manager makes an oer to the owner-shareholder through a contract
satisfying a participation constraint for the shareholders and an incentive condition for the agent.
More competition may reduce the agent's expected utility or income, thereby generating a neg-
ative direct income eect by which the consumption of perks or slack are reduced. But a more
competitive environment means better informed shareholders regarding the actions taken by
the agent, increasing the agent's net-of-risk-premium income and generating a positive income
eect in favor of less eort. The competition eect is therefore ambiguous. In Hermalin (1994),
principal-agent hierarchies compete in the same market. Weak incentives may be the best re-
sponse to strong incentives because the value of incentives is proportional to the rm's lower
expected production level. But an increase in the number of competitors generates a substitution
4
eect along the best reply function and a strategic eect, the rivals' production being sensitive
to the rm's lower cost. Hence, more competition has an ambiguous eect. Finally, in Schmidt
(1997), competition aects incentives through a positive threat-of-liquidation eect, inducing
the manager to work harder, and a negative prot-reduction eect making it less valuable for
the principal to implement strong incentive schemes. He obtains that increased competition
may increase or reduce managerial slack given the opposite signs of the two main eects identi-
ed. Moreover, increasing competition may lower managerial slack when competition is low but
increase managerial slack when competition is already intense.
3 THE MODEL
We consider a natural monopoly
7
which realizes a public project valued S at a cost of
C =    e (1)
where
  2
n
; 
o
is a parameter of cost eÆciency which is privately known by the manager,
where  =     > 0; let  = Pr

 = 

be the common knowledge probability that
the rm is a low cost rm; we will refer to a  rm as a good type rm and to a  rm as
a bad type rm;
 e is the manager's eort level which has a disutility  (e) with  
0
> 0,  
00
> 0,  
000
 0;
let  (x) =  (x)   (x );
 C is observable by the public regulator; we take the accounting convention that it is directly
paid by the regulator.
The rm's utility level is then
U = t   (e) (2)
7
See Laont and Tirole (1993) for a more detailed exposition.
5
where t is the monetary transfer from the regulator to the rm. This transfer has a per-unit
social opportunity cost of 1 +  with  > 0: Consumers' welfare is
S   (1 + ) (t+    e) (3)
and social welfare is taken to be
W = S   (1 + ) (t+    e) + U = S   (1 + ) ( (e) +    e)  U: (4)
Under complete information the regulator would maximize social welfare under the individual
rationality constraint of the rm, that is, U  0. Optimal regulation would lead to eÆcient eort
levels  
0
(e) = 1 or e = e

for both types, and no rents U = 0 for both types. Under incomplete
information, the regulator maximizes expected social welfare under the usual incentive and
individual rationality constraints, that is, solves (with obvious notations)
(MP) max 
h
S   (1 + )

   e+  (e)

  U
i
+(1  )
h
S   (1 + )

   e+  (e)

  U
i
subject to U  U +  (e) ; U  U    (e+) ; U  0; U  0
for which the solution is
 
0
(e) = 1;  
0
(e) = 1 

1 + 

1  

0
(e) < 1 (5)
U =  (e) ; U = 0 (6)
The regulator makes the optimal trade-o between eÆciency and rents. He decreases the incen-
tives of the bad type (e < e

) to decrease the rent of the good type (e).
Such a mechanism can be implemented by an incentive compatible menu of transfer-cost
pairs f(t; C); (t; C)g: the good type rm chooses the rst pair, implying the eÆcient level of
eort (C =    e

) and a positive rent U = t C = (e); the bad type rm chooses the second
pair, implying an ineÆcient level of eort (C =    e) and no rent.
>From (5), incentives of the bad type decrease with increases in ,  and . When  is
higher, the probability of having to give up an informational rent to the good type is higher:
6
the expected cost of this rent is higher and distorting downwards the incentives of the bad type
reduces this expected cost. However, if  is larger than some value 

, it is better to give up
production by the bad type and oer a contract with no rent to the good type. The incentives of
the only active rm are then maximal, as always. The value of 

is determined by the equality
of expected welfare with and without the bad type rm, that is, using (5):
(1  

)
h
S   (1 + )

   e (

) +  (e (

))
i
= 

 (e (

)) (7)
We want to study the eect of competition on this optimal trade-o between eÆciency and
rents. We start by considering the informational eect of competition.
4 THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF COMPETITION
It has often been suggested that competition generates information. Competition allows com-
parisons and being able to compare is being better informed. Rather than looking deeper into
how exactly more competition means more information for the principal or the regulator, we
consider in this section how the menu of contracts oered changes when the regulator has access
to a better information structure. We provide a general description of this information eect on
the power of incentives before looking at special cases.
We model this better information structure as the possibility for the regulator to observe a
signal correlated with the true type of the rm before designing the contracts and determining
in particular the eort level to be induced from the bad type rm. However, contrary to the
literature reviewed in the introduction, we assume that this signal is non veriable and cannot
be used to condition the contract. It is the way yardstick competition works in practice, for
example in the telecommunication and electricity sectors. We then proceed with the comparative
statics analysis of a better information or signal.
4.1 Competition as a better information structure
An information structure for the regulator is a set of signals  = f
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
I
g and conditional
probabilities Pr(
i
j ); i = 1; : : : ; I. For each signal 
i
the regulator computes his posterior
7
belief that the rm is of type :
^
i
= Pr( j 
i
); i = 1; : : : ; I
and an associated strength of incentives dened by the level of eort of the bad type
 
0
(e
i
) = 1 

1 + 
^
i
1  ^
i
 
00
(e
i
) (8)
when the regulator wants to keep both types of rms. Let e
i
= Z(
^
i
1  ^
i
) =
^
Z(^
i
) denote the
solution of (8).
8
Proposition 1 : If Z is concave and ^
i
< 

for all i, then the regulator wishes to keep both
types of rms and the expected power of incentives decreases when the regulator has access
to an informative signal on the private information of the rm.
Proof: By denition,
E

i
^
i
= E

i
(E1
fg
j 
i
) = E1
fg
= :
>From Jensen's inequality, E

i
e
i
 e() i
^
Z is concave. Since  
00
> 0;  
000
> 0, then Z is
a decreasing function. Let h(^
i
) =
^
i
1  ^
i
, then h() is increasing and convex. Hence,
^
Z
00
=
Z
00
h
02
+ Z
0
h
00
. Therefore
^
Z is concave if Z
00
 0. Q:E:D:
We showed above that
^
Z is concave if  () is quadratic or if  is small enough. Note also that
if we dene a signal 
i
as being favorable [unfavorable] if ^
i
> 
i
[^
i
< 
i
], the power of incentives
8
Dierentiating (8) twice and substituting, we obtain
^
Z
00
(^) =  
^
Z
02

 
000
+

1 + 
^
1  ^
 
0000

+ 2
^
Z
0

1 + 
1
(1  ^)
2
 
000
+

1 + 
2
(1  ^)
3
 
00
 
00
+

1 + 
^
1  ^
 
000
:
Therefore, if  (e) is quadratic ( 
00
= , where  is a positive constant;  
000
= 0), we obtain
^
Z
00
(^) =  

1 + 
2
(1  ^)
3
 < 0:
Similarly, if ! 0, we obtain
^
Z
00
(^) =  
2
(1  ^)
3
 
00
1 + 

 
00
+
^
1  ^
 
000
< 0:
Therefore,
^
Z is concave if  () is quadratic or if  is small enough.
8
decreases [increases] after a signal which is favorable [unfavorable]. In the extreme case where
the regulator, observing a favorable signal, keeps only the good type rm, that is, where ^
i
> 

for all favorable signals, it is obvious that the expected power of incentives increases since it
increases when the signal is unfavorable and since the bad type rm is dropped when the signal
is favorable.
Proposition 2 : The expected power of incentives of the active rms increases with the
availability of a signal correlated with the true  i, for all favorable signals (^
i
> 
i
), we
have ^
i
> 

.
Between the two extreme regimes dened by propositions 1 and 2, the expected power of
incentives may increase or decrease depending on the probabilities of the signals leading to the
liquidation of the bad type rm. We now illustrate these two propositions with four relevant
cases.
4.2 Four Special Cases
Case 1: A general non-degenerate signal.
We rst assume that competition allows the regulator to obtain imperfect but valuable informa-
tion on the cost function of the rm. We model this form of yardstick competition as follows:
the regulator can observe an informative signal  2 f; g correlated with the true type of the
rm, that is,
Pr

 j 

= Pr

 j 

=  
1
2
Pr

 j 

= Pr

 j 

= 1  :
As  increases, the informativeness of the signal increases, that is, the regulator's condence
in the signal increases. We want to investigate the eect of an increase in  on the power of
incentives. For reasons of simplicity, let us consider the special case where  (e) =
1
2
e
2
with
 = 1. As long as the regulator wants to keep both types of rms, we nd that:
dEe
d
< 0; (9)
9
a direct illustration of Proposition 1.
9
In a sense, the cost of implementing a larger eort from the
bad type rm increases [decreases] with  following a favorable [an unfavorable] signal because
 is then a more reliable predictor of the eÆciency of the rm. Observing  [] implies a higher
[lower] probability that an informational rent will be captured by the rm, hence an increase [a
decrease] in incentives.
There is a value 

dened by




+ (1  )(1  

)
= 

;
where 

is dened by (7), beyond which the bad type rm is shut down after a favorable signal
 but remains active after an unfavorable signal . >From then on, the expected eort of the
bad type increases with  and reaches the eÆcient level when  = 1 (See Figure 1). Proposition
1 holds for  < 

and Proposition 2 holds for  > 

.
With more signals, we have the following situation, illustrated in Figure 2. For  < 
1
,
Proposition 1 holds and expected incentives decrease. When  reaches 
1
, the bad type rm
is dropped after signal 
4
. When  reaches 
2
, the bad type rm is dropped after signal 
3
.
Between 
1
and 
2
the expected incentives can decrease or increase depending on the probability
of 
4
. For  > 
2
, Proposition 2 holds and expected incentives increase. The transition between
the two extreme cases depends nely on the specics of the problem.
9
Let  and  be the posterior probabilities that the rm is of the good type after observing  and  respectively.
We have

1  
=

1  

1  
and

1  
=

1  
1  

The eort level of a bad type rm after a favorable signal is then
e () =
1

 

1 + 

1  

1  
;
de ()
d
< 0;
d
2
e ()
d
2
< 0
Similarly after an unfavorable signal
e () =
1

 

1 + 

1  
1  

;
de ()
d
> 0;
d
2
e ()
d
2
< 0
Since Pr() = (1  ) + (1  ), Pr() = + (1   )(1   ) and Ee = e()Pr() + e()Pr(), we obtain
dEe
d
< 0;
d
2
Ee
d
2
< 0:
10
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Case 2: The true type is discovered with probability .
We now consider another example where the regulator discovers the true type of the rm with
probability  and nothing with probability 1   .
10
This case refers to the possibility that a
benchmarking study the regulator can conduct will reveal either the true eÆciency of the rm
(with probability ) or nothing useful (with probability 1  ). The uninformative signal is like
a signal 
1
such that Pr(
1
j ) = Pr(
1
j ) = 1   . Observing 
1
gives no information to
the regulator and the power of incentives is unchanged. The favorable signal 
2
is such that
Pr(
2
j ) =  and Pr(
2
j ) = 0. Observing 
2
, we know for sure that the rm is of the good
type: eort is eÆcient and no rent is captured by the rm. The unfavorable signal 
3
is such
that Pr(
3
j ) = 0 and Pr(
3
j ) = . Observing 
3
, the regulator knows for sure that he is
facing a bad type rm: eort is eÆcient and no rent is left to the rm. Globally, the expected
eort of the bad type (conditionally on being used) increases with : either there is no change,
if 
1
is observed, or e = 1 if 
3
is observed. We are indeed in the special case of Proposition 2.
Case 3: Only good type rms are discovered.
If only good rms can be identied following the benchmarking study, then Pr(
1
j ) = 1  ,
Pr(
1
j ) = 1, Pr(
2
j ) = , Pr(
2
j ) = 0, and Pr(
3
j ) = Pr(
3
j ) = 0. If the study
reveals no new information, then it is an unfavorable signal since
^ =
(1  )
1  
< ;
and incentives increase.
Case 4: Only bad type rms are discovered.
If only bad type rms can be discovered, then Pr(
1
j ) = 1, Pr(
1
j ) = 1  . Pr(
2
j ) =
Pr(
2
j ) = 0, Pr(
3
j ) = 0, Pr(
3
j ) = , The power of incentives increases when a bad
type rm is observed. When the type of the rm is not observed, it is a favorable signal. As
long as ^ =

1  (1  )
< 

, both types of rm are kept and we are in the case of Proposition
1 and incentives decrease. If ^ > 

, we are in the case of Proposition 2 and incentives increase.
10
As in Tirole (1986).
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4.3 The general equilibrium eect
To this point, we considered the value of  as given. But this value is the shadow price of the
government budget constraint and therefore will in general vary with the level of expenditures.
We consider in this section the general equilibrium eect of an improvement of information on
the power of incentives taking into account the induced change in . As  increases, the regulator
has access to a better information structure and therefore can leave a smaller rent to the rm,
thus reducing the pressures on the budget constraint and decreasing its shadow value.
11
This
enables him to provide more incentives. The interesting question is then whether this positive
eect on incentives dominates the negative eect identied in Proposition 1. The following case
shows that indeed the general equilibrium eect, through the change in the shadow price of the
budget constraint may be strong enough to change the sign of the partial equilibrium eect.
Let us consider case 4 above where Pr( =  j ) =  and  = ; otherwise; we know that
in this case incentives decrease with an increase in  when the type of rm is not discovered, a
favorable signal leading to ^ = =[1  (1  )] > . The general welfare problem is
max E[(S   t) + (t  (   e)   (e))] = S   

   e+  (e)

  (1  )

   e+  (e)

subject to Et = 

   e+  (e)

+ (1  )

   e+  (e)

+ (e)  K:
We obtain
 
0
(e) = 1 

1 + 

1  
1
1  

0
(e) (10)
that is, in the quadratic case

where  (e) =
1
2
e
2
and (e) = (e 
1
2
)

e =
1

 

1 + 

1  
1
1  
(11)
where  is now the (endogenous) multiplier of the budget constraint. The budget constraint is
[   e

+  (e

)] + (e)
+(1  )[   e

+  (e

)] + (1  )(1  )[   e+  (e)] = K
(12)
11
The general equilibrium eect is related to the government global nancial needs and becomes signicant
when some form of benchmarking or CCT is available and implemented for most if not all government activities
or expenditures.
13
that is, with a quadratic  (e) function:
E + [( + (1  ))(
1
2
e
2
  e

)] + (e  
1
2
) + (1  )(1  )(
1
2
e
2
  e) = K: (13)
We obtain
de
d
=
(1  )(
1
2
e
2
  e)  (1  )(
1
2
e
2
  e

)
 + (1  )(1  )(e  1)
> 0 (14)
d
d
< 0 (15)
The partial analysis of case 4 above (considering  as xed) led to
de
d
< 0; we therefore conclude
that the general equilibrium eect of d (through
d
d
< 0) is, in this case, of a sign dierent
from that of the partial equilibrium eect of d. The power of incentives increases because a
larger  implies on average a less stringent budget constraint. However, it is not always true
that the general equilibrium eect will overcome the partial equilibrium eect. We illustrate
this in Appendix 1.
A better information structure aects the regulator's welfare maximization problem and the
level of incentives in three ways. It aects the expected cost of the project,
12
the level of the rent
(e) through its eect on the eort level e, and the probability that this rent will be captured,
that is, the posterior probability that the rm is a good type rm. Those eects modify the
budget constraint and therefore its shadow value.
5 THREAT OF LIQUIDATION AND INCENTIVES
A dierent channel through which more intense competition is thought to aect incentives is the
threat of bankruptcy or liquidation. For private non regulated rms, liquidation would follow
from the decision of the nanciers to refuse to renance a rm with liquidity constraints because
of its low expected payo. For regulated or publicly owned rms or projects, \liquidation"
would follow from a political decision to stop subsidizing the rm or project or to change the
management team. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that politicians cannot commit not
to use a much better alternative technology if and when it becomes available. Hence at the time
12
In our context, there is no quantity eect since we are considering the realization of a given project. More
generally, there would be a change in the production level too.
14
of the contract, the current rm faces a probability of being dropped or liquidated.
13
We are
discussing a kind of auction which reduces the rent of the rm and induces higher eort as in
Laont and Tirole (1987). The lack of correlation between the rm's type and the alternative
technology explains why the full extraction of the surplus, as in Cremer and McLean (1985),
does not occur. We can suppose for instance that the alternative technology would allow the
realization of the public project at some cost C, a random variable with prior distribution
function G(C) and density g(C). If C <  (e) +    e, then the switch to the alternative
technology would take place, that is, a new rm or management team would be chosen to realize
the project and the current one would be \liquidated". Hence, the probability of no liquidation
is given by Pr
h
C >  (e) +    e
i
= 1   G

 (e) +    e

an increasing function of e.
14
We
want to characterize the impact of such a liquidation rule on the intensity of incentives.
For reasons of simplicity and specicity, we will assume that the liquidation rule takes the
following reduced form: when the rm is of type , there is a probability of liquidation which
increases with the cost of the rm and therefore decreases with the eort level e. Let 1  kÆ (e)
denote this probability of liquidation where Æ
0
(e) > 0 and k is a positive parameter. Incentive
compatibility implies that the rent of the eÆcient rm now takes the form U = kÆ(e)(e).
15
If we
denote by S the social welfare when liquidation occurs, that is when the alternative technology
is used to pursue the project, expected social welfare is

h
S   (1 + )

 (e) +    e

  kÆ(e)(e)
i
+(1  ) kÆ(e)
h
S   (1 + )

 (e) +    e
i
+ (1  )(1  kÆ(e))S:
13
Stricto sensu, one does not expect that a public quasi-monopoly rm such as a state-owned power generating
rm, telecoms or rail or marine transportation rms would simply be shut down. But the management team could
be replaced if it were perceived as ineÆcient and the rm could face signicant restructuring, with downsizing
and outsourcing, if its operating costs were deemed too high.
14
The experience of the Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) process in the U.K. is an interesting real
example. Before oering a public service directly to the citizens, through a publicly owned Direct Service Orga-
nization (DSO), a municipal government must invite private rms to bid for the project or service together with
the DSO who must act then as a separate entity. If a private rm outbids the municipal DSO, then it wins the
contract and the DSO is \liquidated". If not, the DSO is awarded an incentive contract for the service or project.
The U.K. experience shows that DSOs won about 70% of the contracts and were therefore \liquidated" with a
probability of 0.3.
15
Choosing the contract (t; C), the eÆcient rm faces the risk of losing the contract to the alternative technology;
it captures (e) with probability kÆ(e).
15
Maximizing we obtain (assuming concavity in e):
 
0
(e) = 1
 
0
(e) = 1 

1 + 

1  

0
(e) 

1 + 
Æ
0
(e)(e)
Æ(e)
+
Æ
0
(e)
(1 + )Æ(e)

S   (1 + )( (e) +

   e) 

S

: (16)
A marginal increase in the threat of liquidation (increase of k) has no eect, because it has
no eect on the rent extraction-eÆciency trade-o (since the information rent decreases exactly
as the gain from having the ineÆcient rm active decreases), and it has no eect on the rate of
increase of the probability of liquidation Æ
0
(e)=Æ(e).
Proposition 3: The power of incentives is insensitive to a marginal increase of the proba-
bility of liquidation, as long as the regulator's optimization program remains concave.
Note however that with a more general formulation Æ(k; e), we would get results depending
on the cross derivative
@
2
Æ(k; e)
@e@k
.
6 COMPETITION IN TALENT
An alternative channel through which competition operates is that it increases the `market' value
of good agents in the private sector. It will then be necessary to oer higher payos to good type
agents in the public sector in order to meet their participation constraint. This channel brings
into focus the relationship between the public sector wage structure and the private sector one.
There are good reasons why one may expect that the wage structure is more egalitarian in the
public sector. One such reason is the redistribution objective of the government. In this context,
public authorities act as if they were using a modied utilitarian social welfare function where
a weight 

< 1 is associated with the prot or informational rent of the good agent. This will
lead to larger overall eÆciency distortions in order to lower the less valuable informational rent.
Using the social welfare function
S   (1 + )(t+    e) + 

(t   (e))
16
that is,


S   (1 + )

   e+  (e)

  (1 +   

)(e)

+ (1  )

S   (1 + )

   e+  (e)

we obtain the rst-order condition
(1 +   

)
0
(e)  (1  )(1 + )
 
 
0
(e)  1

= 0
that is, for  = 1  

,
 
0
(e) = 1 

1  
+ 
1 + 
 
00
(e)
implying, since  > 0, a reduction in e and (e), that is, lower incentives and a smaller rent for
good type agents.
The trade-o between eÆciency and rent minimization is in a sense solved in favor of rent
minimization: eÆciency is lower, that is, incentives are weaker but the good types capture
a smaller informational rent. In the private sector, the absence of a redistribution objective
together with competitive pressures make the rms behave as if, in order to avoid being cream-
skimmed on the labor market, a utilitarian objective function with 

> 

were used and
therefore bring out a solution more in line with eÆciency: stronger incentives are implemented
and larger rents are captured by the good type. As competition in the private sector increases,


increases, generating more intense competition for the public sector which is implicitly led
to increase the value of 

in order to avoid the loss of the more capable, good type agents.
Hence, although there may not be a perfect alignment of incentives between the public and
private sectors, the emergence of a more competitive environment would aect both.
In our model this competition in talent phenomenon can be modeled as an increase in the
reservation utility level of a good type manager which was so far normalized at zero. Let U
0
be
this new reservation utility level. The maximization program of the regulator (MP) is as given
above except for the participation constraint of the good type which becomes
U  U
0
:
There are four regions of interest, as represented in Figure 3.
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-FIGURE 3
U
0
0
(e) (e

) (e

+)
As long as U
0
  (e), with e dened by (6) and obtained for U
0
= 0, the optimal regulation is
unchanged since the information rent is large enough to satisfy the new participation constraint
of the good type agent. However, when U
0
becomes larger than this information rent  (e) but
is still less than (e

), the relevant binding constraints become the two IR constraints and the
incentive constraint of the bad type. Eort level e is still dened by  
0
(e) = 1 and e is simply
dened by  (e) = U
0
: So the eort level of the bad type is increased (incentives increase) in
order to create a suÆciently large rent (but not larger than necessary) for the good type to stay
in the public or regulated rm.
When U
0
becomes larger than  (e

) but still less than  (e

+), there is no point in
increasing further e which has reached the eÆcient level e

. Only the IR constraints are binding
and both eort levels are eÆcient.
Finally, if U
0
becomes larger than  (e

+), the incentive constraint of the bad type
agent becomes binding. A rent must be given up to the bad type. To mitigate this rent, the
eort level e is increased beyond the eÆcient level. It is dened by
 
0
(e) = 1 +

1  

1 + 

0
(e+)
Competition from the unregulated sector obliges the public sector to select incentive schemes
which are even more powerful than the eÆcient ones to keep the good type within the public
sector.
Proposition 4: Competition in talent always favors stronger incentives.
7 A MORE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
Another meaning of increased competition is that the unregulated (private) sector which pro-
duces goods that are substitutes for the regulated sector good has become more competitive.
18
A more competitive unregulated sector either produces at lower cost than before or produces
goods which have become better substitutes. We consider the eect of those changes on the
power of incentives in the regulated sector.
Let us assume that the social value of production from both sectors is now given by
S (q
1
+ q
2
) + q
1
q
2
where q
1
is the variable output of the regulated sector and q
2
is the output of the competitive
sector and where   0 is a measure of how complementary the products of the two sectors
are. As  increases [decreases], the goods become more complementary [substitute]
16
and the
demand of each good increases [decreases] as usual.
Assuming that C(q
2
) = cq
2
, that the output of the regulated rm is \sold" at its marginal
value level, that the proceeds go into the public budget and are therefore generating an extra
value of p
1
(q
1
; q
2
)q
1
, and that the benevolent regulator cares about total welfare, we can write
the regulator's objective function as
S (q
1
+ q
2
) + q
1
q
2
+ U   (1 + ) (t+ (   e) q
1
)  cq
2
+ p
1
(q
1
; q
2
)q
1
;
where U = t    (e) is the regulated rm's utility. Under full information, the regulator wants
the rm to exert the optimal level of eort e

characterized by  
0
(e

) = q
1
for both types of the
regulated rm while operating a transfer t leaving no rent to the regulated rm, U = U = 0.
We assume that  2
n
; 
o
is private information of the rm while the private sector
technology, that is c, is common knowledge. This simplifying assumption can be justied by
the yardstick competition in the private sector which generates a perfect informative signal
making c known to the regulator. The regulator maximizes the expected social welfare under the
usual individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints of both types and balances
eÆciency and rents by determining the output and eort levels of the regulated sector as a
function of . We obtain (see Appendix 2):  
0
(e) = q
1
and  
0
(e) = q
1
 

1 + 

1  

0
(e) < q
1
:
We can model an increase in competitive pressures by making the private sector more eÆcient,
that is reducing c, or by making the two goods better substitutes, that is reducing .
16
The cross derivative of social welfare with respect to q
1
and q
2
is S
00
+ ; if S
00
+  > [<] 0, the goods are
demand complements [demand substitutes].
19
7.1 The reduction in private sector costs
Let us rst consider a reduction in c. We can show (see Appendix 2) that, whatever the
eÆciency of the regulated sector, a reduction in production cost c increases the output of the
private sector but may increase or decrease the production of the regulated sector. Let us assume
that the products are demand substitutes, that is S
00
+  < 0.
17
If the products are demand
substitutes and strategic substitutes,
18
then the production of the regulated sector decreases
when c decreases, implying a reduction in incentives (no change in eort e but a reduction in
eort e) and in the rent of the eÆcient type rm. If the products are demand substitutes and
strategic complements with  large enough, then the production of the regulated sector increases
when c decreases, implying an increase in incentives (no change in eort e but an increase in
eort e) and in the rent of the eÆcient type rm.
The intensity of incentives, measured by
19
k =
 
0
(e)
C
e
=
 
0
(e)
q
1
;
remains constant (at k = 1) for the eÆcient type but may increase or decrease for the ineÆcient
type, depending on the value of . For  small, the eect of a reduction in c on the intensity of
incentives is of the same sign as the eect on the production level of the regulated sector. But
for  suÆciently large, we can have an opposite sign:
20
if the products are demand substitutes
but strategic complements and the value of  is large enough, a reduction in the marginal cost
c increases both production and eort in the public sector, but nevertheless the intensity of
incentives decreases, as shown in Appendix 2.
Proposition 5: If the regulated product q
1
and the private sector unregulated product q
2
are
strategic substitutes, then a reduction in marginal cost c reduces incentives for the regulated
17
The reader can adapt the analysis to the case of demand complements.
18
The products are strategic substitutes [complements] if the marginal social revenue from good i decreases
[increases] with the production of good j, that is, if S
000
q
i
+S
00
+  < [>] 0. If the goods are demand substitutes,
we have S
00
+  < 0; hence whether the goods are strategic substitutes or strategic complements depends on the
sign and magnitude of S
000
q
i
relative to S
00
+ . See Appendix 2 for details.
19
The intensity of incentives corresponds to that part k of the realized cost which is borne by the rm at the
margin: if U = t kC (; e; q)  (e) = t k (   e) q  (e), then U
e
= kq  
0
(e) = 0 implies k =
 
0
(e)
q
2 (0; 1]:
20
Unless 
00
= 0, as for the quadratic case  (e) =
1
2
e
2
.
20
rm. If the products are strategic complements and  is large enough, then a reduction in
c increases incentives for the regulated rm.
So if greater competition means lower cost competitors, strategic complementarity and a high
social cost of public funds are the keys to greater production of the public sector and therefore
to greater eort and larger rents. When  is large but not too large, greater eort is equivalent
to higher power of incentives.
21
7.2 Improved substitutes for the regulated rm's product
Let us now consider an increase in substitutability, that is, a reduction in . We can show
(see Appendix 2) for both  and  that the eect of a change in  on the production level and
eort level in the public sector are of the same sign. If the products are strategic complements
with  large enough, then the product levels q
1
and q
2
as well as the eort level e are all reduced
as  decreases. Indeed, a reduction of  increases substitution but also reduces the value of
both commodities to consumers. If on the other hand the products are strong enough strategic
substitutes, the substitution eect may dominate and q
1
may increase as well as e.
Proposition 6: If the regulated product q
1
and the private sector unregulated product q
2
are strategic complements with  large enough, then the incentives of the regulated rm
decrease with an increase in the degree of substitution. If the products are strong enough
strategic substitutes, then the incentives of the regulated rm increase with the degree of
substitution.
When more competition means better substitutability between the public and private sectors
products (and an increase in their global demand), then strategic substitutability is the key to
higher production, eort and rent in the public sector (unless the social cost of public fund is
low).
21
We need
 > max f
 (S
00
+ )
S
00
+  + S
000
q
1
and
 
00
 
00
+

1 + 

1   

00
>
 
0
q
1
;
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It is important to stress here that we have simplied the analysis by taking the particular
cost function C = (   e)q which yields the rst order condition of the bad type
 
0
(e) = q
1
 

1 + 

1  

0
(e)
from which the eects of competition can be tracked. Clearly these eects work through q
1
by changing the social protability of eort. With a more general cost function satisfying the
incentive dichotomy property C = C((; e); q
1
) the channel would remain similar,
@C
@e
replacing
q
1
. If we drop the incentive dichotomy assumption, competition can aect more directly the
incentive constraint and the rent. The marginal rent is now given by 
0
(e)E

(; e; q) where
E(; e; q) is the solution in e of

C = C(; e; q), that is, the eort level which enables a rm of
type  to produce q with a cost of

C. Furthermore, the pricing equation requires an incentive
correction and the eect of a change in the production level, due to increased competition, on
the eort level is obtained by dierentiating the whole system
p
1
  C
q
1
p
1
=

1 + 
1
^
1
+ I
 
0
(e) =  C
e
(; e; q)  

1 + 

1  

0
E

(; e; q):
8 CONCLUSION
We characterized the eects of stronger competitive pressures on public sector incentives, more
precisely on the level of incentives in an optimally regulated sector. Maybe contrary to conven-
tional wisdom or a rst intuition, greater competition does not always call for higher incentives.
We identied dierent channels through which competition aects the power of incentives.
First, we looked at the information channel, namely the idea that more competition provides
the principal, the regulator, with information about the agent, the regulated sector. We showed
in propositions 1 and 2 that the eect of better information on the power of incentives may be
positive or negative. If the quality of the competition signal is suÆciently high to induce the
regulator to drop the public project following a favorable signal, the power of incentives increases;
if it is not, then the expected power of incentives decreases if the eort level is a concave function
22
of the hazard rate; the latter is veried in two important particular cases, when the cost of eort
is quadratic and when the social cost of public funds  is small. Moreover, we characterized
the general equilibrium eect of a better information structure, considering  as endogenous,
and we showed that its sign may be dierent from that of the partial equilibrium eect. The
main reason for the ambiguous results is that greater information provided by a more competitive
environment may alter the desirable trade-o between eÆciency and rent extraction towards less
rent extraction on average. However, when the competition signal is better, that is, becomes
very informative, the expected result obtains.
Second, we looked at the threat of liquidation eect and we showed that the power of
incentives is insensitive to local increases of this threat. Third, we analyzed the competition in
talent eect and we showed that this eect increases also the power of incentives.
Fourth, we considered a model of a more competitive environment and we showed (i) that the
eect of a cost reduction in the competitive unregulated sector, producing a substitute product to
that of the regulated rm, on the power of incentives is negative [positive] when the products are
strategic substitutes [strategic complements and  is large], and (ii) that the eect of an increase
in substitutability between the products is positive [negative] if the degree of demand substitution
is strong enough [if the products are strategic complements and  is large]. The main reason for
the ambiguous result is that the desirable change in the power of incentives is related to the level
of activity of the regulated rm and to the interaction between eort and production level in the
cost function. Depending on the nature and strength of the substitutability or complementarity
between the regulated product and the goods produced by the unregulated competitors, greater
competitive pressures from the latter may call for a shrinkage or an expansion of the public
sector, and that determines to a large extent the desirable change in the power of incentives.
A next step in the analysis would be to recognize that, for political economy reasons, reg-
ulation is not optimized and study to which extent the increase in competition disciplines the
regulators.
22
22
This would require an explicit political economy model as in Boyer and Laont (1999) or an explicit hierar-
chical model with incomplete contracts as in Laont and N'Guessan (1999).
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Appendix 1
A Non-Reversing General Equilibrium Eect
We consider the general equilibrium eect for the following information structure of case 1. We
have
e() =
1

 

1 + 

1  

1  
(17)
e() =
1

 

1 + 

1  
1  

; (18)
hence e()  e(), and the budget constraint
[   e

+
1
2
e
2
+ (e() 
1
2
)] + (1  )(1  )[   e() +
1
2
(e())
2
]
+(1  )[   e

+
1
2
e
2
+ (e() 
1
2
)] + (1  )[   e() +
1
2
(e())
2
] = K
(19)
Totally dierentiating the system of equations (17), (18) and (19) with respect to e(), e(), 
and , we obtain
de() de() d d
1 0 B
1
C
1
0 1 B
2
= C
2
A
1
A
2
0  
where   = [(e() 
1
2
)  (e() 
1
2
)] + (1  )[(
1
2
(e())
2
  e())  (
1
2
(e())
2
  e())] < 0,
with e() and e() given by (17) and (18), and
B
1
=
1
(1 + )
2

1  

1  
> 0; B
2
=
1
(1 + )
2

1  
1  

> 0
C
1
=  

1 + 

1  
1
(1  )
2
< 0; C
2
=

1 + 

1  
1

2
> 0
A
1
=  
1
1 + 
< 0; A
2
=  (1  )
1
1 + 
< 0
with the determinant  =  A
2
B
2
  A
1
B
1
> 0. Observing that A
1
< A
2
< 0, jC
1
j > jC
2
j and
B
1
> B
2
> 0, we obtain
d
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2
A
2
  C
1
A
1
< 0
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0
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C
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B
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 A
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B
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> 0:
The sign of
de()
d
may be positive or negative. It depends on two eects: the partial equilibrium
eect ( xed) and the general equilibrium eect through
d
d
< 0, namely
de()
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/
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+
B
1
B
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 
A
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where the rst term is negative [equal to C
1
< 0] and the second term is of the sign of
   +A
2
C
2
=    

(1 + )
2

2
1  
1  

2
:
Indeed, for  =
2
9
;  =
1
3
;  =
3
4
, we have
de()
d
=  1:31 if  =
2
3
, and
de()
d
= +0:49 if
 =
3
4
.
Appendix 2
Increases in Competitive Pressures from the Private Sector
We wish to maximize social welfare
W = 
h
S

q
1
+ q
2

+ q
1
q
2
  (1 + )

 (e) +

   e

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2
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1
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  (1 + )
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
q
1

 cq
2
+p
1
(q
1
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2
)q
1
  U
i
subject to
IR : U  0
IR : U  0
IC : t   (e)  t   (e) +  (e)
IC : t   (e)  t   (e )
with  (e) =  (e)   (e )
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Totally dierentiating the relevant systems of equations, we nd the eect of a change in c:
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As for the intensity of incentives k, we have
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The intensity of incentives for the good type remains constant but, for  suÆciently large and

00
6= 0,
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:
Regarding the eect of a change in , we nd:
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ect dominates and
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As for the intensity of incentives k, we obtain similar results as in the case of a change in c. We
have
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The intensity of incentives for the good type remains constant but, for  suÆciently large and
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6= 0,
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:
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